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Georgia on a Fault Line
By Jaba Devdariani (1)
UN Association of Georgia
After a period dominated by Russian security threats, Georgia enters a year in which 
Pankisi Gorge and Iraq, Abkhazia and Afghanistan, remote Georgian villages and the 
London ricin threat connect in a most surreal way. With the world security architecture in 
flux, Tbilisi finds itself on the fault line of a love-hate relationship between the US, 
Europe and Russia, while facing internal and external challenges to its national security. 
Whereas the security concerns dominate, the crucial elements of democratic transition 
suffer neglect. In an election year and as the race to succeed President Eduard 
Shevardnadze in 2005 looms, the current array of problems does not constitute the best 
possible scenario for Georgia.
Terrorism threat: Menace or bargaining chip?
In a recent speech, President George W. Bush listed Georgia among international 
terrorism’s targets in Europe, alongside Russia, Germany, the UK and France. (2) 
Mentioning Georgia in the context of the war on terror has become habitual for the US 
administration and for international media as well. Georgia, and its Pankisi Gorge in 
particular, are seen both as a locus and as a victim of terrorism.
Addressing the UN Security Council on 5 February, US Secretary of State Colin Powell 
showed a picture of al-Qaeda operative Abu ‘Apsi, allegedly cooperating with al 
Zawahiri, thereby providing a link between al Qaeda and Iraq. In turn, al Zarqawi and 
Abu ‘Apsi allegedly were masterminding a ricin poison conspiracy, uncovered by the 
British special services in London. Georgian Minister of State Security Valeri 
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Khaburdzania subsequently announced that his office had provided information on the 
ricin case to Western special services. (3) Earlier, the ministry had presented previously 
classified materials regarding Pankisi Gorge, confirming the presence of organized 
terrorist groups from Chechnya and Arab countries.
But a cloud of secrecy remains around specific terrorists and their plans. This allows 
skeptics to question a connection between Georgia, Pankisi and international terrorism 
networks. Georgia has made a rapid about-face, from denying the terrorist presence to 
admitting its existence. Currently, government officials synchronize their new statements 
on Pankisi with the Iraqi crisis, trying to show linkages but presenting no additional 
credible evidence. Thus, there is a perception that the new hype regarding Georgia’s 
Pankisi Gorge is a PR stunt aimed at getting some tangible security benefits. Some 
analysts argue that realpolitik is the name of the game.
Secession and rift with Russia:
Clear and present danger
Recently, Georgia’s primary security concern has been to avoid the flare-up of violence 
in its secessionist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In Abkhazia, two issues 
closely linked with Russia have upset the fragile balance. Russia has provided eased 
citizenship to the holders of the old, Soviet, passports. Thus, de facto authorities of 
Abkhazia argue, more than 70 percent of the current Abkhazia residents are Russian 
citizens. This development heightens Georgian fears of Russian military interference on 
the pretext of assisting its citizens. At the same time, railway communication between 
the Russian city of Sochi and the Abkhaz capital of Sukhumi was resumed without prior 
notification to the Georgian authorities, in violation of Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) agreements calling for the restriction of trade and communications with 
Abkhazia.
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These two developments have further strained Russo-Georgian relations. A meeting 
between Presidents Shevardnadze and Vladimir Putin in Kyiv during the informal CIS 
summit, as well as the visit of a Georgian parliamentary delegation to Moscow, helped 
to defuse the crisis somewhat. However, the level of confidence between the two 
countries is still at an all-time low.
In South Ossetia, local officials led by President Eduard Kokoev have expressed their 
fears of a possible Georgian military attack. According to the Georgian Minister of State 
Security, Valeri Khaburdzania, several T-55 tanks and armored vehicles recently have 
been shipped to the secessionist capital of Tskhinvali from North Ossetia. The Osset 
leadership also promotes Russian citizenship, creating the same problem Georgia faces 
with Abkhazia.
There has been no improvement in the deadlock between Georgia and Abkhazia and no 
visible solutions are on the horizon. One option for Abkhazia, proposed officially by 
Georgia’s government, calls for modification of (Russia’s) peacekeeping mandate to 
allow for the return of (ethnically Georgian) displaced persons, at least in Abkhazia’s 
easternmost Gali district. Russia so far remains deaf to these requests. Moreover, UN 
Resolution 1462 of 30 January 2003 offers little hope for ameliorating this situation. (4)
The only change that has been seen, in fact, concerns US reactions to these events. 
US Department of State spokesperson Richard Boucher stated that the United States 
wants to see rapid progress towards political negotiations to resolve the Abkhazia 
conflict as well as the return of displaced persons. (5) Douglas A. Davidson, a US 
diplomat at the OSCE Permanent Council, also expressed his "deep concern...over the 
treatment of ethnic Georgian residents of the Gali district." (6)
Through its OSCE delegation the US expressed its anxiety about any arms buildup in 
South Ossetia. (7) But Russian cooperation on most of the issues remains elusive. 
Georgia’s parliamentary chairman, Nino Burdjanadze, noted after her visit to Russia that 
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Georgia does not rank high on Moscow’s priority list, thus there is little hope for 
cooperation concerning conflict-resolution proposals.
Facing the deadlock in conflict resolution, the Georgian government has renewed its 
attempts to link Abkhazia and South Ossetia to an anti-terrorism program. At a 
government session on 15 February, Khaburdzania said some of the terrorists who 
were driven from Pankisi Gorge in the course of 2002 found shelter in Abkhazia. 
According to Georgia’s Ministry of State Security, the eastern regions of Abkhazia (i.e., 
Gali and Ochamchire) are under the informal control of a Chechen-Abkhaz criminal 
group. Khaburdzania has also stated that, while they were in Pankisi, the terrorists 
received armaments and ammunition from the lawless areas of the secessionist 
provinces, as well as from Russian military bases in Georgia. (8)
Since clean-up operations last year in Pankisi, near the self-styled South Ossetian 
republic, the secessionist Ossetian leadership has claimed persistently that Georgia 
was poised to attack it. To be sure, real and perceived threats from Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, along with increased military spending and US assistance, tempt the Georgian 
politicians to demonstrate the power to resist. At the same time, similar perceptions 
within Abkhazia and South Ossetia embolden the rebel officials’ militant rhetoric and 
reinforce a siege mentality among the population, making it even harder to seek a 
political solution to the conflicts, and increasing the likelihood of sporadic violence.
US military assistance: An irresistible offer
Georgia has drastically improved its military capabilities since the 2002 launch of the 
US-funded Georgia Train-and-Equip Program (GTEP). A $64-million effort is planned to 
build a corps of Georgia’s rapid reaction forces, drawing on the expertise of US military 
instructors. So far, the first command battalion has completed the training, in the 
process earning compliments from its instructors. Training of the second unit, the 
Sachkhere Mountain Batallion, began on 1 February.
4
Reacting to the overt military threat voiced by President Putin in September, the 
Georgian government has proposed nearly doubling its military spending for 2003. The 
lion’s share of these funds would be applied toward the salary arrears for newly trained 
units. Even with such an increase, Georgia still would have one of the lowest military 
budgets in the CIS and would be dependent on external support, especially from the 
US.
The role of the Georgian military has increased in several directions. First, plans were 
unveiled for the creation of joint Georgian-Azeri-Turkish special units to protect the 
future Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline from terrorist threats. A joint command-
and-control headquarters is envisioned for these units.
Along with the need to improve Georgia’s defense capabilities for the oil markets, 
politicians in Tbilisi have attempted to remain relevant in terms of the international 
political and security crises. Recently, the government decided to increase the Georgian 
peacekeeping presence in KFOR (under German command) to battalion level in the 
next two years.
President Shevardnadze also was among the first to pledge full support to the US 
position in President Bush’s extended showdown on Iraq. Even before Powell’s crucial 
Security Council speech, Shevardnadze charged that Saddam Hussein has weapons of 
mass destruction and should be countered by military force. (9)
Apart from the political support, Georgia has expressed its willingness to allow the use 
of its military facilities by US troops in case of war with Iraq. Following a meeting 
between Stephen G. Rademaker, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, 
and Shevardnadze on 10 February, rumors abounded of ongoing negotiations to use 
Vaziani — the former Soviet air base recently vacated by Russian troops – as one of the 
backup positions for the US air force. President Shevardnadze dismissed these rumors 
on 14 February, but indicated Georgia’s willingness to offer assistance should the US 
make such a request. (10) Sources in the defense ministry also have spoken privately 
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regarding a possible offer of Georgian troops – mainly US-trained commandos – for 
military operations in Iraq or for the post-war peacekeeping phase.
Even if some of these statements are viewed with a grain of salt, the aspiration of 
Georgian politicians and military leaders to seek closer ties with the US is apparent. 
President Shevardnadze recently went as far as to decrease his estimate of Georgia’s 
possible admission to NATO from five to three years.
Still, most of this drive is political. Some fear that it might damage the country’s security 
situation. Certain military analysts argue that Georgia’s repeated portrayal as a staunch 
US partner might induce smaller terrorist or revenge groups, fearful of attacking their 
primary enemy, to deliver instead a deadly strike against its ally, Georgia.
Such a development could prove disastrous for the country’s weak economy and 
virtually nonexistent defense infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the current US military assistance represents an offer that Georgia can’t 
refuse. The uncertain risks of terrorism or worsened relations with EU powers fade 
against the clear and present danger presented by secessionist provinces and its own 
military weakness in the face of Russian encroachment.
Democracy and the rule of law: A secondary issue?
While external security crises frequently challenge the Georgian leadership, 
maintenance of domestic stability during and beyond the parliamentary elections 
scheduled for Fall 2003 should remain a priority. Unfortunately, recent events have 
fostered doubts that this issue is accorded proper weight.
Among the most worrisome events were an armed attack at the opposition New Rights 
Party’s headquarters on 3 February and a 24 January assault on a gathering of minority  
religious congregations. Both events reflected the inability of officials to prevent 
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violence, but also demonstrated the propensity for violent scenarios that exists on the 
eve of elections.
These fears were heightened after opposition leaders warned of the existence of 
paramilitary groups aiming to thwart the elections and targeting the opposition. A 
statement from 12 opposition parties charged that the government was responsible for 
instigating the violence.
While this statement can be contested, it is apparent that the likelihood of an unstable 
election season does exist. The local elections of June 2002 saw the re-emergence of 
armed groups that threatened and pressured the precinct commissions, resulting in the 
cancellation of elections in Zugdidi (West Georgia) and Rustavi (East Georgia). 
According to the opposition, some of the pro-government provincial executives may use 
the same tactics to maintain their positions beyond the elections. Given the sluggish 
economy and acute political problems, the government should expect a major electoral 
failure.
Under these circumstances, analysts see troubling signs — particularly the increased 
rates of petty crime (including robbery, muggings and assaults) in the capital and other 
urban areas. Such increases usually indicate that governmental control over the 
situation is slipping.
Currently the country possesses only limited law enforcement resources to address 
both wider security concerns and the domestic criminal situation, while protecting its 
citizens’ basic rights. However, it may well be that the government’s capacity to ensure 
the democratic transition of power would decisively demonstrate the viability of 
Georgia’s political system.
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Shaky ground
The debate about a war with Iraq has strained the existing international security 
architecture. Since 11 September 2001 there have been shifts in the alignments among 
world powers, but the new system has not fully emerged. Unfortunately, Georgia – 
which still struggles to establish its statehood – finds itself along the fault lines of the 
current debate. It is situated only 400 kilometers away from Iraq’s northern border, and 
is alleged to be simultaneously a base and a target of terrorist groups.
In addition, unfinished separation business with its northern neighbor, Russia, heightens 
the perceptions of external security threats, especially as Russia is believed to have had 
a heavy hand in the secessionist activities of Georgia’s provinces, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Under these circumstances, the temptation to tread the path of increased 
militarization is very real, especially since US assistance seems to be available under 
the shared anti-terrorism agenda.
However, it is crucial for the Georgian government to strike a balance between the 
credible buildup of its defense capabilities and the continuation of democratic change. 
Georgia’s Western allies should consider whether they would like to see the country as 
a front line partner, or as a beachhead of democracy in a troubled region.
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